


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No Match, No Vote

Responding to the loud wake-up call sounded in the 2000 election, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002, including provisions to streamline and modernize voter registration databases and establish identification requirements. However, in direct contravention of the intent of HAVA—to impose fair and more uniform standards for state election administration—some states have misinterpreted the law and passed onerous “No Match, No Vote” laws.

Under such statutes, if a state is unable to match the information on a voter’s registration application with information in an existing government database, the application is denied outright. Many of these non-matches, however, can be the result of errors outside of the applicant’s control such as typographical data entry errors, flaws in existing governmental databases, and poor database matching protocols. By making it more difficult and sometimes impossible for applicants to register to vote, No Match, No Vote laws can and do disenfranchise qualified citizens. Shortly before the 2008 election, *Time* magazine declared the “Database Dilemma” number one on their list of “Things That Could Go Wrong on Election Day.”¹

Fortunately, the majority of states have not adopted draconian No Match, No Vote policies. In some states, when election officials cannot find a match, they contact the applicant to request further proof of identification. If the attempt to contact the applicant is unsuccessful, those states usually allow him or her to cure the non-match by showing identification at the polling place, or provide for other methods of verifying identity. Currently, the major problems lie in

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Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, and South Dakota. These four states have enacted strict No Match, No Vote laws, where applicants are not added to the rolls of registered voters until the states receive identification or other verification of the applicant's driver's license, identification card, or Social Security number.

As this paper will demonstrate, plenty of research exists to show that matching voter data with other government databases—though required by HAVA—is an unreliable, error-laden process, and that conditioning the right to vote on such a flawed system will inevitably disenfranchise eligible citizens. HAVA's verification provisions were put into place to improve state database management and facilitate accurate record keeping. These provisions were written to ensure that every voter's registration record has a unique number associated with it to allow states to easily identify duplicate registration records with greater confidence and determine and eliminate voters no longer eligible to vote in that jurisdiction.² As the legislative history points out, it was not HAVA's intent in requiring a match to disenfranchise those otherwise eligible applicants whose data does not match exactly. Therefore, in order to comply with federal law while maintaining the rights of its citizens to vote, states should follow the best practices discussed below.

Emergence of No Match, No Vote Problems

After the 2000 election, the cracks and flaws in the nation's electoral systems were more visible than ever. In an effort to update outdated procedures and create more consistent processes across the country, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to “establish

minimum election administration standards.”³ One of HAVA's most significant advances in the administration of elections is its requirement that each state create and maintain a single, uniform, computerized statewide voter registration list.⁴ This list was designed to replace the lists that each county or election jurisdiction had previously kept individually, which were often incomplete, disorganized, or contained inconsistent data.⁵

To ensure that the data is complete and accurate, and to reduce any duplicate entries that might appear, each legally registered voter's database entry must contain a unique identifier.⁶ For new applicants, this identifier is the applicant's driver's license number, the number on a state-issued identification card, or the last four digits of the applicant's Social Security number.⁷ If an applicant does not have a current and valid driver's license, state issued identification, or Social Security number, the state will create and assign the applicant a number that will serve to identify the applicant for voter registration purposes.⁸

HAVA Sec. 303(a)(5)(B) is the most contentious when dealing with No Match, No Vote laws. State election officials and the state motor vehicle authority are required to enter into an agreement to match information in the statewide voter registration database with information in the database of the motor vehicle authority to the “extent required to enable each such official to verify the accuracy of the information provided on applications for voter registration.”⁹ The same matching procedures are to be done between the voter registration database and the Social Security Administration database when the voter registration forms contain partial Social Security numbers instead of a driver's license number.

HAVA does not define the terms “match” and “verify,” leaving it up to each state to determine how to use its

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databases in the registration process. The Brennan Center for Justice argues that, "...the statute does not even require that 'verification' be used for the purpose of confirming a voter's identity. Verification could, and indeed should, also be used not only for correcting bureaucratic errors and improving confidence in the state's administrative recordkeeping, but also for the purpose of supplementing information or correcting errors on voter registration applications."¹⁰ These new databases and coordinating procedures were set up with the explicit goal of making the administration of elections more efficient, but some state bureaucrats have used these provisions to impose additional barriers on the road to voter registration.

After HAVA was passed a number of states enacted No Match, No Vote laws, which require an exact match to be found before the applicant can be registered to vote. This standard usually requires matching of the same name, date of birth, and a unique identifying number in the two databases being compared. Since those policies were first passed, a number of states (including California, Maryland, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington) have abandoned them for policies that more faithfully comport with the spirit and intention of HAVA. Unfortunately, four states (Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, and South Dakota) still insist on using these matching procedures, which prevent eligible applicants with unsuccessful matches from becoming registered to vote.¹¹

Problems with No Match, No Vote Laws

Underlying all of the specific problems with No Match, No Vote laws is the general issue of how far those policies distort HAVA's purpose and instead create unneces-

sary barriers to registration and voting. The legislators at the forefront of the implementation of HAVA made their intentions clear that nothing in HAVA was meant to prohibit a state from registering applicants whose information cannot be matched. In fact, Senator Chris Dodd (D-CT), one of HAVA's sponsors, stated explicitly that a missing or incomplete number is not an automatic disqualification from registration. He explained, "[I]t is simply not an accurate reading of this section to conclude that a lack of a match or a "no-match" will result in the invalidation of a voter's registration application. . . [N]othing in [Section 303(a)(5)(a)] prohibits a State from accepting or processing an application with incomplete or inaccurate information."¹² Senator Kit Bond (R-MO) concurred, explaining that the electronic verification of an individual's identity against existing state databases was simply a process that states may follow in lieu of an individual's providing proof of identity.¹³ A state may also verify and prove voters' identities by requiring first-time voters to show ID and matching the voter's signatures.

Another major problem with No Match, No Vote laws is the myriad of flaws inherent in the matching process itself. Poor database construction and bad matching programs can impair even a process intended to be as protective of applicants as possible. The most accurate voter registration application, entered into the state's voter registration database with the utmost care, will not produce a match if that existing database contains errors. Married names may also create problems in non-matches between databases, for example a voter may have a driver's license issued in her maiden name but register to vote with her married name, causing a non-match. The same is true for double surnames and hyphenated names, which can also create problems when they are entered into various databases differently or into the same database inconsistently

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by different data processors. Nicknames (Bill v. William) and suffixes (Jr., Sr.) present similar issues. First and last names can often be reversed in the database, a problem especially common with ethnic names that are unfamiliar to clerks. Perhaps the most troubling issue arises when non-matches are due to typographical or data entry errors, clearly beyond the control of the voter.

The negative impact of No Match, No Vote laws is startling, especially since the non-matches are due to no fault of the applicant. The Brennan Center estimates that matching voter data fails from 20 to 30 percent of the time, and anecdotal evidence supports this proposition.¹⁴ In 2008, Wisconsin became aware of this problem when they proposed an exact match rule. Not only did they find that more than 20 percent of new voters did not match Department of Transportation records on first comparison, but four of six members of their Government Accountability Board (G.A.B., which runs state elections) failed the initial check.¹⁵ Elections Division Administrator Nat Robinson noted, “This is significant because two-thirds of the G.A.B., made up of long-time voters and well-respected former judges, could have been forced to vote on provisional ballots. It’s clear the data quality issue must be addressed before this cross-checking function can be used to ensure reliable voter data.”¹⁶ Because of these startling results, the Division decided to adopt a less strict matching procedure. All new voter registration information will be matched against DOT records, and when voter information does not match DOT records, the municipal clerk will review the original registration documents to check for data entry errors. If the discrepancy is not resolved, the clerk will send a letter to the voter to clarify the difference.¹⁷

A high frequency of non-matches is not just a characteristic of state and local databases—; they are just as common

in national databases. As of February 2007, the Social Security Administration (SSA) reported that 46.2 percent of their 2.6 million attempted matches resulted in a failed match, acknowledging that the vast majority of these were false negatives (eligible voters who exist in the SSA Database, but whose records were not matched).¹⁸ A June 2009 study from the Social Security Administration Office of the Inspector General found that their no-match response rate had improved, but was much higher than other verification programs—31 percent versus 6 to 15 percent—and admitted that their program provides states with inaccurate verification responses.¹⁹ The SSA recognizes the seriousness of the failures in their system and acknowledges that the Social Security Administration’s Help America Vote Verification (HAVV) program “provided the States with responses that may have prevented eligible individuals from registering to vote and allowed ineligible individuals to vote. Given that the HAVV verification responses are used as part of the process to approve or deny an applicant’s right to vote, SSA should consider working with the States to develop an acceptable level of false negative or false positive verification responses.”²⁰ The report finds that the high rate of errors are due to the limitation of only using the last four digits of the Social Security number and the lack of flexible matching criteria in their program.²¹ The SSA plans to conduct a separate review focusing on states’ use of the HAVV program and what actions are taken when the state receives a no-match response from SSA.²²

A related problem with the matching process is the variations in the criteria determined to constitute a “match.” Some states’ matching programs use a stricter standard and require an exact match of all data fields. Other states recognize that errors are commonplace in databases and instead employ a more flexible standard, often compiling a list of possible matches, taking into account typographical

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errors and common nicknames.

The essential policy issue raised by No Match, No Vote laws is the question of what a state does with a voter's registration application if no match is found between the information provided and the existing government database. Four states employing the strictest No Match, No Vote procedures reject a registration outright if no match can be found.²³ Other states are more flexible and place the applicant on the pollbooks, often as "provisional" or "pending" voters, which may require additional identification or an affidavit to complete the registration process and vote by regular ballot.²⁴ Those states will only allow non-matched applicants to vote by provisional ballot, which will then only be counted if the identification number or voter's identity is verified. While the use of provisional ballots is better than the outright rejection of non-matched applicants, it is nonetheless problematic. In the 2008 general election, only 67.3% of provisional ballots were counted in whole or in part; according to the Election Assistance Commission, more than 600,000 provisional ballots were rejected. Acceptance rates vary widely among states; in 2008, Maine fully counted 100% provisional ballots cast and Alaska fully or partially counted 98.7% of provisional ballots cast, while Delaware counted only 15.7% and Oklahoma only 16.6% of provisional ballots cast.²⁵

Also troublesome are the differing ways in which states notify (or do not notify) applicants of their failure to match and their resulting registration status. This may vary based simply on the criteria used to match the voter's application. For example, when reporting a non-match, the Social Security Administration does not tell the state which part of the record failed to match, making it difficult to determine where the problem lies and who must correct the error.²⁶ Notifications also vary between

jurisdictions and often contain confusing or incomplete instructions on what steps the voter must take to complete his registration.

The final area of variation among the states is the ability of an applicant to correct or cure a non-matched application. This is another procedural hurdle, as it shifts the responsibility back to the voter even in situations when a non-match is caused through no fault of his or her own. According to the Brennan Center, as of 2006, twenty-two states allow an applicant to resolve errors in the registration process even if the voter registration deadline has passed; ten will accept corrections, but not for the purposes of voting in the upcoming election; and three states will leave the decision up to the local jurisdiction.²⁷

The problems created by No Match, No Vote laws are especially troublesome for minority voters. In Florida, between 2006 and 2007, African-Americans and Latinos made up less than 30 percent of the voter registration applicant pool, but their applications were roughly 65 percent of all those rejected in those years because of non-matches.²⁸ Even in the months after Florida's No Match, No Vote law was amended (see page 7), nearly 9,000 new registrants have not been matched with existing records. About 27 percent of the rejected registrants said they were Hispanic and 27 percent identified themselves as African-American, while less than 20 percent of the rejected registrants were White.²⁹ While the No Match, No Vote laws may not be intended to disenfranchise minorities, they may have that effect due to naming conventions in some ethnic groups (for example, the common hyphenation of Latino surnames).

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Litigation

The recent proliferation of No Match, No Vote laws and procedures has spawned several court challenges, with markedly different results. This is an evolving area of voting rights law and should be watched carefully.

Washington

In 2006, the Washington Association of Churches³⁰, an association engaged in voter registration, brought suit to strike down Washington's newly enacted "matching" law. The new law, RCW 29A.08.107, required the secretary of state to "match" the applicant's driver's license number, state identification card number, or last four digits of the Social Security number with existing state databases or determine that the applicant does not have any of those numbers.³¹ Only once this match or determination could be made was the secretary allowed to place the applicant on the official list of registered voters. The Washington Association of Churches argued that this matching requirement constituted an absolute precondition to voter registration.³² The law contained a safeguard, in which an applicant whose information could not be matched would be contacted, but the plaintiffs argued that this did not solve major problems with the matching procedure—the errors in the existing state databases and the protocol used to match the information—both of which are beyond the applicant's control.

After the law was preliminarily enjoined in 2006, the parties settled and entered into a consent agreement in March 2007. Under this agreement, the state was enjoined from enforcing the statute in a way that would deny a voter registration application solely because of a failure to match an applicant's driver's license number, state identification card number, or Social Security

numbers from the voter registration form with existing government databases. The consent order set forth a five-part analysis for provisional registration that the state is to follow based on the state's ability to match information. First, if there is a match, the applicant shall be registered to vote. If a match cannot be made but the applicant presents an election official with an alternative form of identification, the applicant shall be registered to vote effective as of the "date of submission or receipt of the original application."³³ If the applicant does not become registered under either of these scenarios, the state is required to provisionally register the applicant and promptly notify the applicant in writing of this status and the need to provide additional documentation or information. The applicants in this third group are included in the official rolls of registered voters and permitted to cast a ballot in any primary or election, but their cast ballots cannot be tabulated until the State receives the additional documentation sufficient to register the voter (information or documentation that would put the voter into one of the first two categories). Finally, the order allows the State to remove a voter from the roll who has stayed in provisional status for two general federal elections since the date of the original application.

Florida

Opponents of No Match, No Vote laws met a much different fate in Florida in a suit brought by the Florida NAACP.³⁴ Florida had enacted a law similar to Washington's, stating that an application would not be considered "valid," and the applicant not registered, unless and until the state performed a successful database match or otherwise verified the number provided by the applicant. The law also provided that the State must correspond with the applicant about the absence of a match, but the burden

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then shifts to the applicant to prove the authenticity of the number supplied on the application. If the applicant cannot be reached or does not provide the evidence the state deems necessary to verify the application, the applicant may only vote by provisional ballot.

Plaintiffs argued that this law effectively transformed the government function of assigning each voter a unique identifying number into a barrier to registration and voting. Eligible and truthful registration applicants whose information does not exactly match information in other databases suddenly become presumptively ineligible, and will have to struggle—often without knowing the problem and often unsuccessfully—to have their votes counted.³⁵ The plaintiffs repeated a major concern from the Washington Association of Churches case: a U.S. Government Accountability Office report, which said that the biggest problem state officials are facing is that the Social Security Administration is not specifying what voter information was not matching, and that without this information applicants are not able to efficiently resolve the non-matching problems.³⁶

Though their allegations and the challenged law were almost identical to the Washington case discussed above, the plaintiffs had a much more difficult time convincing Florida's federal courts of the matching law's legal shortcomings. In December 2007, the District Court for the Northern District of Florida granted an injunction for the plaintiffs, finding that the matching law had resulted in "actual harm to real individuals." However, in April 2008, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the injunction without ruling whether the law was unconstitutional, but holding that plaintiffs did not make a strong enough showing that an injunction was necessary on the ground that federal statutes preempted the Florida matching law. In response to the litigation, as well as the public

and media condemnation of the law and its confusing standards, the legislature made changes to the No Match law, which the plaintiffs again challenged by filing a renewed motion for preliminary injunction, this time on constitutional grounds. They continued to argue that the notification and subsequent applicant verification process was flawed because some applicants never received notices of the non-matches, and the notices that were received contained no information about the defect in the application or the source of the non-match. Further, plaintiffs maintained that the standards for Election Day verification were confusing and difficult for poll workers to implement. The motion was denied primarily because the Court believed that plaintiffs did not adequately present evidence that the new law imposed the same harms as the original statute. The state argued, and the Court agreed, that verification was made easier because applicants could verify their identity by showing a form of ID (driver's license, state-issued ID card, Social Security card) to authenticate their number, regardless of what number they actually listed on their application.³⁷ This amendment, they argued, no longer limits the ability to verify and establish one's actual number to those who originally wrote the number correctly on their application form. The state also argued that it had improved the matching process and provided further guidelines to increase the effectiveness of the notification process.

What the Florida statute fails to provide, unlike the Washington statute, is the right of unmatched applicants to be provisionally registered, pending further verification of their identities. Washington also provides a more robust and complete notification process, an essential part of any valid matching process, given all of the common flaws in existing state databases.

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Best Practices

More Flexible Match Criteria and Procedures

Because the result of a failed match can be the disenfranchisement of an eligible voter, election officials should make every effort to err on the side of accepting the application. This means using a more flexible standard when determining what constitutes a “match.” Exact matches in every field should never be required because of the flaws routinely seen in existing government databases. States should set their matching programs (and direct the Social Security Administration to do the same) to search for matches and, when an exact match cannot be found, it should compile an extensive list of “possible matches.” This means that more fields should be searched to determine a match—name, date of birth, and identifying number are probably the best and most common. The program should build in commonly recognized nicknames, so that the difference between William and Bill does not keep an eligible applicant from becoming a registered voter. Suffixes (i.e. Jr., Sr.) should be disregarded when accumulating a possible match list, as they are often inconsistently entered into databases. The program should allow dates and identifying numbers to be a few digits off, to account for possible typos and mistakenly “flipped” digits. Even the best-designed matching program cannot equal the best practice possible—a manual review of possible matches. Often, an application may be so riddled with computer and/or human errors that only a human reader can spot and fix the mistakes. When a fundamental right such as voting is at stake, a human review should be the minimum standard.

Alternate Means of Voter ID Verification

The bipartisan sponsors of HAVA recognized that voting is such an important right that the law must operate to include as many voters in the political process as possible. As Senators Bond and Dodd pointed out, registering applicants, even those with imperfect applications, is required to comply with the legislative intent of HAVA. As the Brennan Center explains, a failed match should produce only the single adverse consequence expressly provided in HAVA: a citizen registering by mail and voting for the first time in a given jurisdiction is subject to an identification requirement, unless the state is able to match the information in her registration form. The match thus serves as one means by which the state may identify an applicant; if the match fails, the state must use some other means of identifying the applicant.³⁸ States have a variety of methods available to them for confirming an applicant’s identity, most easily by requiring ID for first-time voters. If a state decides to register a non-matched applicant as a “provisional” voter able to cast only a provisional ballot, the state must ensure that it educates voters on the mechanics of a provisional ballot and clearly explains to each voter that additional identification will be required for the provisional ballot to be counted as a vote.

More Effective Notifications

Notifications to applicants regarding a failed match should be prompt and in plain language. The notifications should explain what field did not match the existing state database and, whenever possible, attach a copy of the registration application so that the applicant can

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see what errors he or she may have made on the form. A detailed explanation of the applicant's registration status and instructions for correcting the problem to achieve registration should also be included, along with the applicable deadlines. Whenever possible, a mailed notification should be followed up with a phone call. The Social Security Administration should update its notification process to identify for states which field failed to match so that the information can be passed onto the applicant.

Easy-to-Understand Correction Procedures

The process to correct an application should be as easy as possible. Applicants should be able to cure their timely filed applications even if the voter registration deadline has already passed. If states follow the previous recommendation that even non-matched applicants be placed on the pollbook pending the submission of further documentation, allowing corrections after the deadline should not be problematic—election officials will simply have to find the applicant's record and change their status from provisional to fully registered. Correction of a defect in an application should not require the filing of a new form if it is sought within a reasonable time period (such as the same election cycle, or within one year of the application). Applicants should be able to correct defects by bringing their driver's licenses, state-issued ID cards, or Social Security cards to their local election offices. They should also be given the opportunity to cure their application by sending the required documentation (i.e. photocopy of an aforementioned card) via postal mail or fax. If an application could not be matched because of incomplete data, the original application should be returned to the individual with the missing section visibly flagged so that the applicant may complete and return the form.

Conclusion

HAVA was designed to establish minimum election administration standards and streamline the administration of elections across the country, but No Match, No Vote laws have only succeeded in creating more confusion and inconsistency. These laws are not merely a minor issue in the administration of elections; they strike right at the core, disenfranchising qualified voters whose applications do not match a demonstrably flawed system of state and national databases. Though only four states have established hard-line No Match policies, there are still a number of ways that states can and do make the voting process more difficult through their matching procedures. By adopting the best practices suggested here, states would go a long way towards registering voters more accurately and ensuring that no eligible citizen is disenfranchised.

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- 1 Michael Scherer, *7 Things That Could Go Wrong on Election Day*, Time, Oct. 29, 2008, available online at http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1853246_1853243_1853233,00.html.
- 2 See Statement of Senator Kit Bond, 148 Cong. Rec. S10488-02, *S10490 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2002).
- 3 Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-252 (2002).
- 4 42 USC 15483(a).
- 5 Justin Levitt, Wendy Weiser, and Ana Muñoz, *Making the List: Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration*, Brennan Center for Justice, p. 1 (Mar. 24, 2006).
- 6 HAVA Sec. 303(a)(1)(A), 42 USC 15483(a)(1)(A)(iii).
- 7 HAVA Sec. 303(a)(5)(A), 42 USC 15483(a)(5)(A)(i).
- 8 HAVA Sec. 303(a)(5)(A), 42 USC 15483(a)(5)(A)(ii).
- 9 HAVA Sec. 303(a)(5)(B), 42 USC 15483(a)(5)(B)(i).
- 10 Memorandum from the Brennan Center for Justice to ACORN and the Advancement Project 3 (May 29, 2006), available online at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/d/download_file_36684.pdf.
- 11 These states' No Match, No Vote laws can be found at Fla. Stat. §97.053(6) (2009); Iowa Code §48A.8(2) (2008); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18:101.1 (2009); and S.D. Codified Laws § 12-4-5.5 (2009).
- 12 148 Cong. Rec. S10488-02, S10504-05 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2002) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
- 13 148 Cong. Rec. S10488-02, S10489 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2002) (statement of Sen. Bond).
- 14 Adam Skaggs, "No Match" Dropped After 4 of 6 Judges Fail, (Sept. 8, 2008) available online at http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/archives/no_match_dropped_after_4_of_6_judges_fail/.
- 15 Accountability Board Members' Voter Data Do Not Match Department of Transportation Records, (Sept. 4, 2008) available online at <http://elections.state.wi.us/docview.asp?docid=14689&locid=47>.
- 16 *Id.*
- 17 *Id.*
- 18 *FL NAACP v. Browning*, Pl. Am. Compl. at 28.
- 19 *Quick Evaluation Response: Accuracy of the Help America Vote Verification Program Responses*, US Social Security Administration Office of the Inspector General, June 2009, p.4, available online at <http://www.ssa.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF/A-03-09-29115.pdf>.
- 20 *Id.*
- 21 *Accuracy of the Help America Vote Verification Program Responses* at 5, 11.
- 22 *Id.* at 5.
- 23 These states are Florida, Iowa, Louisiana and South Dakota. Florida does allow a provisional ballot to be cast if the name is not matched, but the ballot will only be counted if the voter provides his or her identification to the Election Supervisor no later than 5 p.m. on the second day after the election. It is not clear from the statute whether or not the applicant's name is ever placed on the pollbook, even in a provisional or pending status. See Fla. Stat. §97.053(6) (2009).
- 24 *Making the List* at 16.
- 25 Election Data Services, *The 2008 Election Administration and Voting Survey, A Summary of Key Findings*, November 2008, at 47 and 48, http://www.eac.gov/program-areas/research-resources-andreports/completed-research-and-reports/program-areas/research-resources-and-reports/copy_of_docs/2008_electionadministrationvotingurvey_508/attachment_download/file.
- 26 *FL NAACP v. Browning*, No. 4:07CV-402-SPM/WCS (N.D. Fla.), Pl. Am. Compl. at 15 (filed Sept. 21, 2007).
- 27 *Making the List* at 19.
- 28 *Challenges to the Vote 2008*, Brennan Center for Justice, p. 15, available online at http://brennan.3cdn.net/93ff2b522861cb9bda_4sm6bsh4h.pdf
- 29 Steve Bousquet, *New Voter Registration Law Snares Mostly Minorities*, St. Petersburg Times (Oct. 17, 2008), available online at <http://tampabay.com/news/politics/state/article858377.ece>.
- 30 The Washington Association of Churches was joined in the suit by ACORN, the Organization of Chinese-Americans of Greater Seattle, Chinese Information and Service Center, Filipino American Political Action Group of Washington, Korean American Voters Alliance, SEIU Local 775, and Washington Citizen Action.
- 31 *Washington Ass'n. of Churches v. Reed*, No. CV06-0726 (W.D. Wash.), Pl. Compl. at 10 (filed May 24, 2006).
- 32 *Id.*
- 33 This may result in two different dates upon which the voter will be considered registered. See *Washington Ass'n of Churches v. Reed*, No. CV06-0726RSM, slip op. at 3 (W.D. Wash. March 16, 2007), available at <http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/STIPULATEDFINALORDERANDJUDGMENTby-JudgeRicardoSMartinez.pdf>
- 34 The Florida branch of the NAACP was joined in the suit by the Haitian-American Grassroots Coalition, and the Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project.
- 35 *FL NAACP v. Browning*, Pl. Am. Compl. at 15.
- 36 *FL NAACP v. Browning*, Pl. Am. Compl. at 15
- 37 If the driver's license number, the Florida identification card number, or the last four digits of the Social Security number provided by the applicant cannot be verified, the applicant shall be notified that the number cannot be verified and that the applicant must provide evidence to the supervisor sufficient to verify the authenticity of the applicant's driver's license number, Florida identification card number, or last four digits of the Social Security number. § 97.053(6), Fla. Stat. (2007).
- 38 *Making the List* at 24.

Project Vote is a national nonpartisan, nonprofit organization that promotes voting in historically underrepresented communities. Project Vote takes a leadership role in nationwide voting rights and election administration issues, working through research, litigation, and advocacy to ensure that our constituencies can register, vote, and cast ballots that count.

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